Published Work
Powell, Jonathan M. and Clayton L. Thyne. Global Instances of Coups from 1950-2009: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research. Forthcoming.
Codebook, Appendices, & Replication Data
We present a new dataset on coups from 1950 to 2009. We begin by explaining our theoretical definition and coding procedures. Next, we examine general trends in the data across time and space. We conclude by explaining why scholars studying a variety of topics, including civil wars, regime stability, and democratization, would benefit by paying closer attention to coups.
Working Papers
“Explaining the Occurrence and Outcome of Coups d’état”
Paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, January 8, 2009. (This is an updated version of a paper presented at ISA-South in September 2008).
Revise and resubmit at the Journal of Conflict Resolution
This article seeks to improve our understanding of the coup d’état by accomplishing two objectives. First, it provides a more holistic assessment of coup activity by offering a general theory that is applicable to a variety of state characteristics. Specifically, any observable factor that can illustrate potential support or resistance to a coup should have an impact on the decision-making calculus of plotters. Coup propensity will drop as perceived costs increase. Second, it aims to fill a major research gap by identifying factors that determine whether an attempted coup will succeed. The theory is tested using a Heckman probit with global data from 1960-2000. Results show strong support for the theory in regards to the decision to launch a coup. In terms of outcome, however, a number of counterintuitive findings arise.
“Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Use of Force”
Paper presented at the American Political Science Annual Meeting, September 2009
Previous work on diversionary theory has largely been focused on democracies, specifically the United States and Great Britain. Attempts to explain the diversionary tendencies of non-democracies have also not specified the conditions under which non-democratic leaders—who do not face the prospect of losing office through elections—should have the need to divert. This paper furthers the literature by offering theoretical expectations that fill this gap. First, regimes (democratic or otherwise) that have a higher likelihood of a coup d’état have greater incentive to divert. Second, the incentive to divert will decrease as other efforts to address this vulnerability increase. Potential coup-proofing alternatives of structural counterbalancing and providing spoils through increased expenditures. The theory is tested with global data from 1962-2000. The analysis shows that democracies do not divert due to coup risk, while the two hypotheses are upheld when looking at non-democracies.
"Domestic Vulnerability and International Conflict in Africa: Military Diversion or Political Inversion?"
"IO Constitutional Norms and the Decline of the Coup d'etat"
.
Powell, Jonathan M. and Clayton L. Thyne. Global Instances of Coups from 1950-2009: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research. Forthcoming.
Codebook, Appendices, & Replication Data
We present a new dataset on coups from 1950 to 2009. We begin by explaining our theoretical definition and coding procedures. Next, we examine general trends in the data across time and space. We conclude by explaining why scholars studying a variety of topics, including civil wars, regime stability, and democratization, would benefit by paying closer attention to coups.
Working Papers
“Explaining the Occurrence and Outcome of Coups d’état”
Paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, January 8, 2009. (This is an updated version of a paper presented at ISA-South in September 2008).
Revise and resubmit at the Journal of Conflict Resolution
This article seeks to improve our understanding of the coup d’état by accomplishing two objectives. First, it provides a more holistic assessment of coup activity by offering a general theory that is applicable to a variety of state characteristics. Specifically, any observable factor that can illustrate potential support or resistance to a coup should have an impact on the decision-making calculus of plotters. Coup propensity will drop as perceived costs increase. Second, it aims to fill a major research gap by identifying factors that determine whether an attempted coup will succeed. The theory is tested using a Heckman probit with global data from 1960-2000. Results show strong support for the theory in regards to the decision to launch a coup. In terms of outcome, however, a number of counterintuitive findings arise.
“Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Use of Force”
Paper presented at the American Political Science Annual Meeting, September 2009
Previous work on diversionary theory has largely been focused on democracies, specifically the United States and Great Britain. Attempts to explain the diversionary tendencies of non-democracies have also not specified the conditions under which non-democratic leaders—who do not face the prospect of losing office through elections—should have the need to divert. This paper furthers the literature by offering theoretical expectations that fill this gap. First, regimes (democratic or otherwise) that have a higher likelihood of a coup d’état have greater incentive to divert. Second, the incentive to divert will decrease as other efforts to address this vulnerability increase. Potential coup-proofing alternatives of structural counterbalancing and providing spoils through increased expenditures. The theory is tested with global data from 1962-2000. The analysis shows that democracies do not divert due to coup risk, while the two hypotheses are upheld when looking at non-democracies.
"Domestic Vulnerability and International Conflict in Africa: Military Diversion or Political Inversion?"
"IO Constitutional Norms and the Decline of the Coup d'etat"
.