Syria's Coups, 1946-Present
Cite as:
Benhammou, Salah, and Jonathan Powell. 2021. "Syria's Coups." In Powell, Jonathan, and Salah Benhammou. 2021. Coups in the Middle East, 1920-2020. University of Central Florida.
Benhammou, Salah, and Jonathan Powell. 2021. "Syria's Coups." In Powell, Jonathan, and Salah Benhammou. 2021. Coups in the Middle East, 1920-2020. University of Central Florida.
March 1949 Coup August 1949 Coup December 1949 Coup
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March 30, 1949
Successful Military Coup Ousted Leader President Shukri al-Quwalti Coup Leader Colonel Husni al-Zaim, Army Chief of Staff |
On March 30, 1949, the Syrian Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Husni al-Zaim, led a successful coup d’etat against the democratically-elected civilian government of President Shukri al-Quwalti. Troops were deployed across Damascus in the dead of night, roughly between 2 to 3 a.m., emptying the streets of any bystanders and securing all of the city’s exits and entries. Meanwhile, al-Zaim ordered the arrests of President al-Quwalti, Prime Minister Khalid al-Azem, and all the cabinet ministers of the civilian government. Al-Quwalti was arrested and detained at a local hospital, where he was receiving months-long treatment for an ulcer. As dawn approached, al-Zaim took to the public radio to announce the coup’s success, decrying the civilian government for its failure to perform as an effective administration and for being rife with corruption. As the morning progressed, swathes of university students took the streets to celebrate al-Zaim’s coup, signaling the public’s support for the army’s intervention. Despite this support, al-Quwalti did not formally resign until April the 6th, but by this time, al-Zaim had already dissolved Parliament and become Syria’s head of state.
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Husni al-Zaim’s coup was the first of many coups d’etat experienced by modern Syria. While this event may have sparked the nation’s long trajectory of political instability, it also occurred as a product of Syria’s pre-existing maladies. Syria achieved independence from France in 1944, negotiated in part by al-Quwalti’s Nationalist Party, but many within the country felt the independence was incomplete. When talks of independence began, elements within Syria expressed a desire for a “Greater Syria”, which would include Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. None of these territories came under the Syrian flag, which led many in the population to hold the Nationalist Party in low regard. In addition, the Nationalist Party failed to secure unity within its ranks, which led to a greater degree of polarization as numerous parties began to splinter off. These parties mobilized support by often recruiting along ethnic and sectarian lines, drawing support from Sunnis, Alawites, Druze, and more. Sunni Arabs were generally the dominant identity in the civilian bureaucracy and often excluded the Alawite and Druze minorities, which fed into ethnic and sectarian tensions.
The 1948 War for Palestine exacerbated the increasing polarization and disdain for the ruling Nationalist Party. Similar to neighboring regimes, the Nationalist Party faced a severe backlash following the crippling defeat during the 1948 War. The administration faced allegations of corruption and mismanagement of military affairs by providing the army with cheap and useless artillery. Protests eventually erupted against the al-Quwalti regime, and it responded by shifting the blame for the defeat onto the Syrian National Army (SNA). This rhetoric was accompanied by a cut to the defense budget, which sparked grievances amongst the armed forces and prompted a backlash. The leader of the SNA, Colonel Husni al-Zaim, quickly acted against al-Quwalti and the Nationalist Party following this shift in rhetoric. While some sources suggest the intelligence agency of the United States played a role in prodding al-Zaim to stage a coup, it is generally agreed upon that the coup would have occurred in any case given the dysfunctionality of the Nationalist Party and its attempts to scapegoat the SNA. With the aid of other senior officers, al-Zaim executed a near-seamless plot on the evening of March 30th, 1949, and wrested power away from the Nationalist Party. Given the unpopularity of al-Quwalti’s regime at the time, it comes as no surprise that the coup was generally unchallenged. The following days after the coup were filled with uncertainty. Al-Quwalti refused to stand down until April the 6th, stubbornly holding onto power despite the popularity surrounding his ouster. Further, the question of succession remained in the air: who would take the leadership? Would al-Zaim directly rule or cede power back to civilians? Al-Zaim claimed that elections and the formation of a new civilian government would be fast approaching, but these promises lacked any credibility. One day after forming a new civilian government of technocrats, al-Zaim dissolved Parliament and sought to rewrite the constitution while also passing a mandate to censor local newspapers. Inevitably, al-Zaim consolidated the role of leadership for himself, taking on the position of head of state as well as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In sum, al-Zaim’s antics began a culture of military involvement in politics and introduced the newly-independent Syria to military rule. |
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