

An Assessment of the ‘Democratic’ Coup Theory: Democratic Trajectories in Africa, 1952-2012

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APPENDIX

This document provides documentation for additional tests that are not included in the manuscript. These tests take three forms. First, the regression models that consider a state’s post-coup fluctuation on the Polity IV scale are replicated here with alternative lengths of the “coup spell.” Tables show length of spells ranging from two to seven years. The three-year spell reflects the model reported in the manuscript (Table 2). Table A reports results for all coup spells (regardless of outcome), Table B reports results for spells following successful coups, while Table C reports the results for spells that follow failed coups.

Second, the rare events logistic regression models are reconsidered here using alternative specifications of “democracy.” Specifically, Table D reports the results for alternative models that utilize democracy classifications from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2014), Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2013).

Third, Table E reports the results of interaction models that are reported in the Manuscript (Figures 2 and 3) but are not reported in the tables. These models are omitted from the manuscript due to space limitations and the inability to directly interpret the interaction coefficients that would be reported (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and Ai and Norton (2003) on these points). The substantive illustration of these models is provided in the manuscript via predicted probabilities and visual representation.

The full manuscript, replication data, and command file can be found at:
http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/democratic_coup_africa.html

Table A: Democratisation during All Coup Spells, 2 to 7 Years Duration

	2 Year	3 Year	4 Year	5 Year	6 Year	7 Year
Polity, t-1	0.936*** (0.007)	0.935*** (0.007)	0.935*** (0.007)	0.935*** (0.007)	0.935*** (0.007)	0.935*** (0.007)
Coup	-1.406*** (0.140)	-1.391*** (0.141)	-1.371*** (0.140)	-1.364*** (0.140)	-1.349*** (0.140)	-1.344*** (0.140)
Coup Spell	0.405*** (0.104)	0.254** (0.092)	0.191* (0.085)	0.153* (0.081)	0.105 (0.078)	0.078 (0.076)
Cold War	-0.607*** (0.077)	-0.604*** (0.077)	-0.604*** (0.078)	-0.603*** (0.078)	-0.600*** (0.078)	-0.597*** (0.078)
British Colony	0.062 (0.072)	0.060 (0.072)	0.060 (0.072)	0.060 (0.072)	0.061 (0.072)	0.061 (0.072)
Independence	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
GDPpc	-0.007 (0.041)	-0.007 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.041)	-0.011 (0.042)	-0.013 (0.042)
Growth	-0.028 (0.270)	-0.031 (0.270)	-0.042 (0.270)	-0.047 (0.270)	-0.050 (0.271)	-0.055 (0.271)
Constant	-0.180 (3.011)	-0.203 (3.016)	-0.255 (3.018)	-0.286 (3.019)	-0.314 (3.020)	-0.330 (3.020)
Observations	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244

Table B: Democratisation during Successful Coup Spells, 2 to 7 Years Duration

	2 Year	3 Year	4 Year	5 Year	6 Year	7 Year
Polity, t-1	0.937*** (0.007)	0.937*** (0.007)	0.937*** (0.007)	0.937*** (0.007)	0.937*** (0.007)	0.937*** (0.007)
Coup	-2.289*** (0.185)	-2.298*** (0.185)	-2.300*** (0.185)	-2.297*** (0.185)	-2.284*** (0.185)	-2.278*** (0.185)
Coup Spell	0.345** (0.129)	0.270** (0.110)	0.196* (0.093)	0.151* (0.085)	0.094 (0.080)	0.055 (0.077)
Cold War	-0.598*** (0.076)	-0.598*** (0.076)	-0.600*** (0.076)	-0.599*** (0.077)	-0.596*** (0.077)	-0.593*** (0.077)
British Colony	0.054 (0.071)	0.055 (0.071)	0.054 (0.071)	0.054 (0.071)	0.055 (0.071)	0.054 (0.071)
Independence	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
GDPpc	-0.019 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.041)	-0.017 (0.041)	-0.018 (0.041)	-0.021 (0.041)	-0.024 (0.041)
Growth	-0.066 (0.267)	-0.071 (0.267)	-0.075 (0.267)	-0.076 (0.267)	-0.078 (0.267)	-0.082 (0.267)
Constant	0.155 (2.978)	0.178 (2.978)	0.194 (2.980)	0.188 (2.981)	0.151 (2.982)	0.124 (2.982)
Observations	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244

Table C: Democratisation during Failed Coup Spells, 2 to 7 Years Duration

	2 Year	3 Year	4 Year	5 Year	6 Year	7 Year
Polity, t-1	0.934*** (0.007)	0.934*** (0.007)	0.934*** (0.007)	0.933*** (0.007)	0.933*** (0.007)	0.933*** (0.007)
Coup	-0.675*** (0.198)	-0.668*** (0.198)	-0.674*** (0.198)	-0.662*** (0.198)	-0.659*** (0.198)	-0.655*** (0.198)
Coup Spell	0.171 (0.143)	0.090 (0.122)	0.103 (0.109)	0.053 (0.100)	0.045 (0.094)	0.022 (0.089)
Cold War	-0.637*** (0.079)	-0.636*** (0.079)	-0.637*** (0.079)	-0.635*** (0.079)	-0.635*** (0.079)	-0.634*** (0.079)
British Colony	0.073 (0.074)	0.073 (0.074)	0.073 (0.074)	0.074 (0.074)	0.074 (0.074)	0.074 (0.074)
Independence	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
GDPpc	-0.003 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.042)	-0.002 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.042)	-0.002 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.042)
Growth	-0.012 (0.275)	-0.012 (0.275)	-0.014 (0.275)	-0.017 (0.275)	-0.017 (0.275)	-0.019 (0.275)
Constant	-0.309 (3.074)	-0.331 (3.075)	-0.322 (3.075)	-0.357 (3.075)	-0.361 (3.075)	-0.378 (3.075)
Observations	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244

Table D: Alternative Specifications of Democracy

	Geddes, Wright, & Frantz			Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland			Boix, Miller, & Rosato		
	All	Success	Failed	All	Success	Failed	All	Success	Failed
Coup	0.536 (0.582)	1.185* (0.551)	0.246 (1.095)	0.684 (0.543)	0.904 (0.675)	1.082* (0.643)	0.518 (0.622)	1.234* (0.609)	0.395 (1.067)
Coup Spell	1.727*** (0.425)	1.800*** (0.400)	1.303** (0.472)	1.133** (0.439)	1.512*** (0.438)	1.025* (0.453)	0.302 (0.482)	0.331 (0.542)	0.325 (0.600)
Cold War	-2.172*** (0.453)	-2.212*** (0.477)	-1.965*** (0.451)	-1.576*** (0.404)	-1.660*** (0.415)	-1.474*** (0.405)	-1.312*** (0.404)	-1.354*** (0.410)	-1.281** (0.415)
British Colony	0.749* (0.385)	0.667* (0.382)	0.650* (0.384)	0.465 (0.390)	0.395 (0.396)	0.459 (0.387)	0.753* (0.400)	0.736* (0.398)	0.745* (0.401)
Independence	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.000 (0.006)
GDPpc	-0.288 (0.222)	-0.389* (0.219)	-0.422* (0.203)	-0.491* (0.217)	-0.525** (0.207)	-0.552** (0.199)	-0.599* (0.270)	-0.607** (0.256)	-0.617** (0.262)
Growth	1.218 (1.103)	0.804 (1.161)	0.966 (1.233)	-1.457 (1.159)	-1.676 (1.084)	-1.740 (1.175)	0.148 (0.782)	0.155 (0.774)	0.042 (0.780)
Constant	3.980 (11.456)	9.910 (10.718)	2.578 (10.688)	-3.352 (13.320)	1.353 (13.471)	-5.450 (13.025)	0.530 (11.670)	1.968 (11.688)	0.227 (11.608)
Observations	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,976	1,976	1,976	1,848	1,848	1,848

Table E: Interactions Reported in the Manuscript

	Full Sample	Cold War	CW-AU Interregnum	AU	Spell*Year (Figure 2)
Polity, t-1	0.941*** (0.007)	0.939*** (0.010)	0.926*** (0.018)	0.973*** (0.010)	
Coup	-2.286*** (0.185)	-2.114*** (0.205)	-2.382*** (0.667)	-2.767*** (0.365)	0.381 (0.757)
Coup Spell	-0.074 (0.160)	-1.189*** (0.260)	0.707* (0.389)	0.849*** (0.235)	-50.550 (69.431)
Polity*Spell Interaction	-0.073** (0.025)	-0.205*** (0.038)	-0.037 (0.062)	-0.217*** (0.069)	
Cold War	-0.606*** (0.076)				-1.364* (0.710)
British Colony	0.046 (0.071)	0.001 (0.095)	0.113 (0.210)	0.194* (0.110)	0.699* (0.370)
Independence	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.006)
GDPpc	-0.024 (0.041)	0.036 (0.055)	-0.129 (0.118)	0.010 (0.058)	-0.827** (0.274)
Growth	-0.058 (0.266)	-0.173 (0.359)	0.345 (0.719)	-0.245 (0.395)	0.011 (1.164)
Year*Spell Interaction					0.026 (0.035)
Year					-0.017 (0.026)
Constant	0.228 (2.973)	-0.655 (3.442)	-3.858 (11.118)	-1.482 (5.052)	-24.759 (52.909)
Observations	2,244	1,307	430	507	1,858

Works Cited

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